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1. INTRODUCTION
There  is  probably  no  other  market  in the world  that  is  as globally
interconnected  as the derivatives  market.  Such  interconnectedness  may
influence  laws  and regulations  regarding  the derivatives  involved.
As the derivatives market, which has existed since the 1980s, is reasonably
new, the high degree of interconnection also affects how norms are created
or implemented  in different  countries.  We  focus  on the interconnections
of the global  derivatives  market.  We  also  examine  how  the market
conditions  of the derivatives  market  affect  the development  of local
and global  regulations  and consider  the strategies  of some Asian  markets
to address  the potential  cross-border  effects  of American  and European
regulations.
In general,  a derivative  is  a financial  instrument  whose  value  refers
to another  financial  instrument  or underlying  variable.1 Depending
on the trading venue,  the derivatives  market can be broadly divided into
two main categories: exchange-traded products and over-the-counter (OTC)
transactions.  Derivatives  also appear in several  different  forms.  The most
fundamental  instruments  are options (i.e. the right  to buy or sell  a certain
asset or variable in the future with the striking fixed at present) and forward
contracts (under which one party agrees to buy and the other agrees to sell
a certain  asset  or variable  in the future  with the price  fixed  at present).2
Standardised  and exchange-traded forward contracts  are  generally  called
"futures". A "swap" is a transaction under which parties agree to exchange
future flows based on benchmarks, such as the relationship between a fixed
interest rate and a floating market rate (e.g. an interest rate swap3), a certain
event  (e.g. a credit  default  swap4)  and the total  return  of an underlying
instrument  (e.g. an equity  swap5).  A derivative  may also  be  incorporated
into  another  financial  instrument  (e.g. a debenture  or deposit)  to create
a hybrid or structured product (e.g. the minibonds or structured notes that
were  issued  to many  Asian  investors  before  the global  financial  crisis6).
1 Hudson, A. (2012) Law on Financial Derivatives 5th Ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 24.
2 Ibid, pp. 28–31.
3 Ibid, pp. 62–63.
4 Ibid, pp. 82–85.
5 Ibid, pp. 71–72.
6 Chen, C. (2011) Product Due Diligence and the Suitability of Minibonds: Taking the Benefit
of Hindsight. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 311–314.
2017] C. Chen: Extraterritoriality of the Regulations ... 325
Parties  often  choose  to settle  trades  in cash,  although  occasionally
underlying assets (e.g. gold or crude oil) may be physically delivered. 
A wide  range of underlying  variables  may be  involved in a derivative
transaction.  Underlying  assets  may  include  securities,  such  as shares
or debentures.  They  may  also  be  the prices  of commodities,  such
as agricultural  products  (e.g. soybean),  precious  metals  (e.g. iron  ore)
or energy (e.g. natural gas).  An underlying variable may also be an index
(e.g. FTSE100), a certain event (e.g. the insolvency of a bond issuer) or even
the weather (e.g. a designated region’s average seasonal rainfall7). Virtually
anything that is  uncertain and that fluctuates may become an underlying
variable  of a derivative  instrument  as long  as there  is  a market  for it
(e.g. forward freight rate swaps for shipping rates or property derivatives
for the rental of commercial buildings).
The variety  of forms,  trading  venues  and underlying  variables  makes
derivatives and the market quite complex. As Part II below will  elaborate,
the derivatives  market,  whether  exchange-traded  or OTC,  is  very
interconnected.  Such  interconnectedness  and complexity  is  eventually
reflected  in contract  and regulatory  issues.  We  analyse  the legal  issues
flowing  from highly  interconnected  derivatives  markets,  how  market
interconnections affect the creation and implementation of derivative laws
and regulations  and the strategies  adopted  by Asian  markets  to deal
with the norms implemented in the core markets. 
In Part  II,  we  examine  different  aspects  of market  interconnection
in the global  derivatives  market.  In Part  III,  we  analyse  some  legal
implications of the derivatives  market interconnections.  We then examine
current  legal  regimes  governing  derivatives.  Furthermore,  we  consider
the extraterritoriality  and territorial  extension  of US  and EU  regulations
(i.e. regulations  from core  markets)  and their  effects  on Asian  markets
before examining different options and the strategies Asian regulators may
use in light of the current market conditions.  In Part IV, we conclude this
article.
2. INTERCONNECTIONS IN THE DERIVATIVES MARKET
The global derivatives market is highly interconnected, which is reflected
in several  ways.  The OTC  market  is  connected  through  major  dealers
7 Henderson, S.K. (2010) Henderson on Derivatives 2nd Ed., London: LexisNexis, pp. 91–98.
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and standard  documentation.  However,  the few  powerful  global  futures
exchanges, each with its own niche products and specialty, further connect
traders from all over the world to participate in setting the prices of major
benchmark  products,  thereby  expanding  the effects  of those  futures
exchanges  beyond  their  geographical  locations.  There  may  also  be
a connection between the OTC and exchange-traded markets.
First,  the global  OTC derivatives  market  is  dominated by a few major
dealers in the US, the UK and Europe (together, the "core markets").  Those
dealers  (e.g. Goldman  Sachs,  UBS  or Deutsche  Bank)  have  branches
or offices in major financial centres (e.g. London, New York City, Singapore
or Hong  Kong)  and are  usually  acting  as counterparties  to other  traders.
The OTC market also has clear power centres in the US and UK. Pursuant
to the Bank  of International  Settlement’s  triennial  central  bank  survey
in 2016, the US led with a US$1,241 billion daily average of all interest rate
derivatives,  followed  by the UK  (US$1,180  billion)  and France  (US$141
billion).8 The same survey in 2013 showed the UK leading with US $1,347.75
billion,  followed by the US (US$628.15 billion),  France (US$202.21 billion)
and Germany (US$101.34 billion),  which ranked second, third and fourth,
respectively.9 These data show that the OTC market is dominated by the US
and UK, the largest trading centres,  which together share more than half
of the global trading volume.
That  the OTC  derivatives  market  has  two  dominant  power  centres
means  that  major  derivatives  dealers  in the OTC  market  are  located
in either  country.  As a result,  traders  from outside  the core  markets
probably  have  to trade  with dealers  from the US,  the UK  or continental
Europe (or through their offices in the local market). This further connects
the OTC derivatives market, as reflected by the financial statements of large
derivatives  dealers.  For example,  the total  notional  amount  of derivatives
traded  in 2014  was  US$6,366.2  billion  for JP  Morgan  Chase,  US$2,909.7
billion  for HSBC  and €5,200.3  billion  for Deutsche  Bank.10 In contrast,
the total  notional  amount  for the ICBC,  the biggest  Chinese  bank,  in 2014
was  RMB2,529.6  billion,  whereas  DBS  Group  Holdings,  which  controls
8 Bank of International  Settlement.  (2016)  Triennial  Central  Bank Survey  of Foreign Exchange
and OTC Derivatives Markets in 2016. [online] Basel: BIS. Available from: http://www.bis.org/
publ/rpfx16.htm [Accessed 6 September 2017].
9 Bank  of International  Settlement.  (2013)  Triennial  Central  Bank  Survey –  Interest  Rate
Derivatives  Market  Turnover  in 2013:  Preliminary  Global  Results.  Basel:  BIS,  p. 1,  Available
from: http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13ir.pdf [Accessed 6 September 2017].
10 See the annual reports of JP Morgan Chase, HSBC and Deutsche Bank for the year of 2014.
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the biggest  bank  in Southeast  Asia,  had  only  approximately  US$1,877
billion  in 2014.11 Although  this  is  not  a complete  comparison,  there  are
significant gaps between large banks in different regions.
Second,  the interconnections  in the OTC  market  are  reinforced
by the widespread  use  of the standard  documentation  issued
by the International  Swaps  and Derivatives  Association  (ISDA)  –  that  is,
the ISDA master agreement and associated forms. Although with no official
statistics,  one estimates  that  approximately  90 %  of OTC  trades  are
processed  using  the ISDA  form.12 Another  estimates  that  85 %
of the collateral agreements reached in the OTC derivatives market in 2011
were  based  on ISDA  documentation.13 Considering  the overall  market
volume,  such  a high  degree  of standardisation  in terms  of contractual
documentation is probably unseen in other markets. 
The widespread use of the ISDA master agreement has its own historical
background.  In the early  1980s,  when  the market  was  growing  quickly,
there  was  strong  demand  for standard  documentation.  This  provided
a backdrop of the establishment of the ISDA by major derivatives dealers.14
Through these  dealers,  the ISDA form quickly  spread to other  markets.15
With market  trading  commonly  conducted  on the same  contractual
platform,  the trading  process  could  be  more  standardised  to further
strengthen  the interconnections  of the OTC  derivatives  market  around
the world.
Third,  futures  exchanges  offer  a way  to examine  the interconnections
in the derivatives market. Although each futures exchange must be situated
in a given  market  (e.g. Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  [CME] in the US),  it
may  have  a global  effect,  especially  large  futures  exchanges  in the US
and Europe.  For example,  setting  the price  of petroleum  on the wholesale
or even retail level may to a certain extent depend on the prices of the West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil  futures traded in the CME. The prices
of some  precious  metals  (e.g. copper  and palladium)  may  partly  depend
11 See the annual report of ICBC and DBS for the year of 2014.
12 Henderson, above note 7, p. 803.
13 Rauterberg,  G.V.  & Verstein,  A.  (2013)  Assessing  Transnational  Private  Regulation
of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform. Virginia
Journal of International Law, 54, pp. 13–14.
14 Flanagan,  S.M.  (2001)  The Rise  of a Trade  Association:  Group  Interactions  within
the International  Swaps  and Derivatives  Association.  Harvard  Negotiation  Law  Review,  6,
p. 234.
15 See  Gao,  S.  and Chen,  C.  (2017)  Financial  Transnationalism  and Financial  Regulation
Change: a Case Study for Derivatives Markets, European Business Organisation Law Review.
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on the prices traded in the London Metal Exchange. The same also applies
for many agricultural products, such as wheat and soybean. 
This partly reflects the price discovery function of the futures market.16
If the price  of a product  in the future  (e.g. the market  price  expected  in 6
months)  is  known,  one  can  determine  the product’s  current  price  using
the market  interest  rate.  Through  the international  trade  of commodities
and raw materials, the price setting function of a futures exchange warrants
the price  of a particular  futures  product  to affect  not  only  local  traders,
but also  a wide  range  of traders  or end-users  in foreign  markets.
For example, the movement of WTI crude oil futures would affect not only
oil  traders  or buyers/sellers  in the US,  but also  those  outside  the US who
adopt the WTI crude oil futures prices as their pricing benchmark.
Sometimes,  a futures  exchange  in one  country  may  offer  a product
whose underlying variable is  something in another country. For example,
the Singapore  Exchange  (SGX)  offers  futures  products  linked  to stock
market  performance  in China  and Taiwan,  such  as the FTSE  China  A50
Index Futures and the MSCI Taiwan Index Futures.17 This may further bind
two or more markets together. 
Cross-trading  and/or cross-margining  may  provide  a further  point
of interconnection  between  exchanges  to facilitate  cross-exchange  trading
and reduce the limitations of geography and time zones. Cross-trading may
help  a trader  to trade  the same  products  in different  markets,  often
in different time zones. For example, the CME and SGX have collaborated
to create  an offset  system  for some  futures  or options  products
(e.g. Eurodollar  futures)  to allow  market  participants  to continue  trading
at any  time  of day,  even  when  one  market  is  closed  for a day.18 Some
exchange  operators  have  collaborated  to create  a link  between  two
exchanges so that market participants on different continents can continue
to trade in their time zones when trading sessions in the original market are
16 Chen,  C.  (2010)  Trading  Risk:  the Contractual  Nature  of Derivative  Instruments  and Certain
Regulatory Issues, VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, p. 101.
17 Singapore  Exchange.  (2017)  Products.  [online]  Singapore:  SGX.  Available  from:
http://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/sgxweb/home/products/derivatives/financials  [Accessed
6 September 2017].
18 CME.  (2017)  CME  Group  Strategic  Partnership  with Singapore  Exchange.  [online]  Chicago:
CME. Available from: http://www.cmegroup.com/international/partnership-resources/sgx-
resources.html [Accessed 6 September 2017].
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closed  (e.g. the Eurex/TAIFEX  link19 or Eurex/KRX  link20).  For example,
a member of Eurex may continue to trade certain products after the Eurex
market  has  closed  but while  the KRX  market  is  still  open,  with margin
and settlement  transferred  back  to Eurex  at the end  of the KRX  trading
session. This provides traders with a seamless trading window, rather than
forcing them to wait for the Eurex market to reopen the next day. Through
a cross-trading link with a foreign futures exchange, an exchange in a home
country  (e.g. Eurex)  may  not  have  to open  another  exchange  in a host
country  (e.g. South  Korea),  thereby  reducing  legal  and operational  costs.
Its users may still enjoy extended trading hours without the need to open
another  trading  and clearing  account  in the host  country.  Such  a cross-
-trading link does not involve clearing services, as all trades would move
back  to the home  exchange  for clearing.  Thus,  there  would  be  fewer
regulatory concerns from the host state. 
Some exchanges and/or clearinghouses may also allow cross-margining,
which refers to an arrangement under which a trader may use the excess
in his or her margin account with a broker to secure another account. Cross-
-margining may reduce a trader’s overall  need to post collateral when he
or she  trades  in two  or more  different  products  and/or in two  or more
different  markets.  However, cross-border cross-margining is  considerably
more  challenging  than  cross-trading.  Instruments  eligible  for margining
(e.g. some  debentures  or securities)  may  not  be  able  to move  seamlessly
from one  country  to another.  However,  enforcing  margins  and collateral
may also be subject to local property law, which may not be harmonised
if the home and host markets have considerably different security interest
laws.  In addition,  whether  it  is  in the form of cash  or other  liquid  assets,
enforcement issues occur when one or more clearing service providers need
to tap into the margin pool. These issues may explain why cross-margining
is  not  very  common  in futures  exchanges,  although  they  may  be  easier
to handle  when  cross-margining  occurs  between  two  exchanges  within
the same country. 
19 CME. (2017) Eurex/TAIFEX Link. [online] Chicago: CME. Available from: http://www.eurex
change.com/exchange-en/products/eurex-taifex-link [Accessed 6 September 2017].
20 Ibid.
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3.  LEGAL  IMPLICATIONS:  EXTRATERRITORIALITY
AND THE GLOBAL FLOW OF NORMS 
The interconnectedness  of the global  derivatives  market  may  affect
the creation  and implementation  of derivative  laws  and regulations.  We
focus  on the potential  extraterritorial  effects  of core  market  regulations
on Asian  markets  due  to strong  market  interconnections,
and on the solutions  and strategies  adopted to address  these  effects.  First,
we analyse the current status of laws governing derivatives and how they
fare  in light  of market  interconnections.  Then,  we  address
the extraterritoriality  of national  regulations  and the need  to harmonise
regulatory  rules,  and discuss  some  concerns  over  global  competition
in exchanges and clearing service providers. 
3.1  CURRENT  STATUS  OF LAWS  GOVERNING  DERIVATIVES:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC DIMENSIONS
The development  of derivative  laws  reflects  the interconnectedness
of the global derivatives market. On the private law side, a distinct feature
of the global  OTC  derivatives  market  is  the adoption  of the ISDA master
agreement  as the standard  form  regulating  a super-majority  of global
trades. In addition, English law or New York law is the default governing
law of the agreement. As English law and New York law are largely within
the common  law  family,  the governing  contractual  norms  of OTC
derivatives are quite uniform. The same business model (i.e. standardised
contracts traded on exchanges before moving to clearinghouses for clearing
and settlement,  supported  by margin  requirements  and membership
agreements)21 is used in almost every futures exchange in the world.22
On the regulatory  side,  there  were  interrelated  regulatory  regimes
at the international  level  after  the global  financial  crisis.  Regarding  OTC
derivatives, radical reforms have been implemented in the past few years.
Before  the global  financial  crisis,  OTC  derivatives  were  commonly  seen
as falling into the "no man’s land" of the overall regulatory system,23 with no
dedicated  regulations.  Regulators  could  indirectly  regulate  derivatives
21 Braithwaite, J. P. (2016) The Dilemma of Client Clearing in the OTC Derivatives Markets.
European Business Organisation Law Review, 17, p. 356.
22 For the life cycle of a typical futures contract, see Chen, above note 16, pp. 79–99.
23 Cohen,  S.  S.  (1995)  Financial  Services  Regulation:  a Mid-Decade  Review:  Colloquium:
the Challenge of Derivatives. Fordham Law Review, 63, p. 2013.
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trading through existing banking or insurance  regulations.24 The situation
changed  radically  after  the collapse  of Lehman  Brothers.  During
the Pittsburgh  Summit  in 2009,  the G20  declared  a commitment
to strengthening  the international  financial  regulatory  system,  such
as by pushing  standardised  OTC  derivatives  to be  traded  on exchanges
or electronic  trading  platforms  and to be  cleared  through  central
counterparties, and to improving transparency by prescribing the reporting
of OTC  trades  to trade  repositories.25 In short,  there  are  three  main
regulatory  mandates  on OTC  derivatives:  trade  reporting,  clearing
and exchange trading.  These mandates are meant to control counterparty
risk,  to improve  transparency  and to prevent  systemic  risk
via the derivatives market.
With international regulators aiming to divert at least some OTC trades
to organised  exchanges  or trading  platforms  and to be  cleared  by central
counterparties,  global regulatory reforms provide further interconnections
between  the OTC  and exchange  markets.  More  trades  must  be
accommodated to improve the regulatory system for central counterparties
(CCPs) and trading platforms. For example, CCPs must have solid solvency
requirements  to prevent  them  from becoming  mammoth  financial
institutions  that  are  too  big  to fail.26 With more  trades  expected  to enter
trading  and clearing  systems,  associated  issues  will  arise,  such
as the fairness  of market  access,  pricing  and competition  or the protection
of customer information and client money.27
24 For example, under Singapore law, an insurer can only trade derivatives  "for the purposes
of hedging  or efficient  portfolio  management".  Investment  of Insurers,  Notice  125.  Republic
of Singapore. Singapore: MAS. In English.
25 G 20.  (2009)  Leaders'  Statement  – the Pittsburgh Summit.  [online] Available  from: http://ec.
europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf
[Accessed 6 September 2017].
26 See  generally  Roe,  MJ  (2013)  Clearinghouse  Overconfidence.  California  Law Review,  101,
pp. 1641–1703;  Yadav,  Y.  (2013)  The Problematic  Case  of Clearinghouses  in Complex
Markets.  Georgetown  Law  Journal,  101,  pp. 387–444;  Chamorro-Courtland,  C.  (2012)
The Trillion Dollar Question: Can a Central Bank Bail Out a Central Counterparty Clearing
House Which Is “Too Big to Fail”? Brook Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 6,
p. 433;  Kress,  JC. (2011) Credit  Default  Swaps, Clearinghouses,  and Systemic Risk:  What
Centralised Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity?  Harvard Journal
on Legislation,  48, pp. 49–93; Nichol,  A. (2013) Hedging against  the Next Financial  Crisis:
Proposals  for Managing  Systemic  Risk  in Centrally  Cleared  Derivatives  Transactions.
Banking and Finance  Law Review,  29,  pp. 169–184;  Wendt,  F.  (2015)  Central  Counterparties:
Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature. [online] IMF. Available from: https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf [Accessed 6 September 2017].
27 See  generally  Greenberger,  M.  (2013)  Diversifying  Clearinghouse  Ownership  in Order
to Safeguard  Free  and Open  Access  to the Derivatives  Clearing  Market.  Fordham Journal
of Corporate & Financial Law, 18, pp. 245–268.
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However,  the power  imbalance  in OTC  derivatives  has  remained
unchanged since the global financial crisis. The market for exchange-traded
derivatives  and derivatives  clearing  is  still  dominated  by a few
of the largest Western exchange operators and CCPs. For example, in 2017,
CCPs clearing in multiple popular currencies (i.e. US dollars, pounds, euros
and Japanese yen) can only be found in three financial centres (i.e. London,
Chicago and New York).28 Thus, new regulatory reforms may create further
issues  if trades  from all  over  the world  are  cleared  in a handful  of CCPs
situated in a few countries. 
A competition  effect  may  also  exist.  The cross-border  merger
and acquisition  of futures  exchanges  and CCPs  (especially  across
the Atlantic) amidst EU reforms to break up the "vertical silo" model29 may
further affect how the market evolves. In other words,  current regulatory
reforms  seem  to favour  incumbent  exchange  operators  and CCPs
in the West by prescribing trade reporting, clearing and trading mandates.
As we argue in the following, this may further strengthen the market power
of Western traders, making it more difficult for other markets to catch up.
Next,  we  consider  the extraterritoriality  of laws  coming
from the interconnections of the global derivatives market. We then address
some  competition  effects  and the effect  of harmonising  regulatory  rules
at the international  stage  on Asian  regulators  when  designing  regulatory
rules  in light  of the market  dominance  and interconnections  in the global
derivatives market. 
3.2 EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF REGULATIONS AND SUBSTITUTED
COMPLIANCE
As discussed  previously,  one  prominent  feature  of the global  derivatives
market is that there are two clear power centres: the US and UK. The major
dealers  from these  centres  dominate  the markets.  The US  market  is
regulated  by US  federal  and state  regulations  and the UK  market  is
governed by UK regulations (and henceforth influenced by EU regulations
at least  until  the conclusion  of Brexit),  which  creates  two  tiers  of legal
interactions.  One  question  concerns  the coherence  of US  and EU
28 Stafford  P.  (2016)  US  Eyes  Prize  in Brexit  Battle  Over  Derivatives.  Financial  Times,  20
October.  Available  from:  https://www.ft.com/content/8ae3e610-908b-11e6-a72e-b428cb934
b78 [Accessed 6 September 2017].
29 See  Financial Times. (2008)  Clearing the Way. 17 April. Available from: https://next.ft.com/
content/135b1744-0be2-11dd-9840-0000779fd2ac [Accessed 6 September 2017]. 
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regulations.  As both  sides  of the Atlantic  have  large  derivatives  dealers,
a conflict  of regulations  between EU and the US may affect  the operation
of the market.  This  is  much  less  an issue  on the private  law  side,
as the ISDA  master  agreement  generally  adopts  either  New  York  law
or English law, which both share common law heritage, as the governing
law. However, there may be conflicts regarding the regulations or relevant
rules.  For example,  whether  the level  of the initial  margin  or variation
margin  for non-cleared  derivatives  differs  significantly  in the US
and the EU  may  create  room  for regulatory  arbitrage  and impose
considerable  compliance  costs  on firms  trading  on both  sides
of the Atlantic.30
Another  question  concerns  how  US  and/or EU/UK  law  affect  other
countries  (e.g. Asian  financial  markets)  when  dealers  trade  in the main
markets or with dealers from the US or Europe.  This  raises  concerns over
the extraterritoriality  of US  and/or EU  law.  As the laws  governing  major
markets  may  affect  traders  and trading  activities  in other  markets,
the problem of the extraterritorial application of domestic regulations arises.
This further prompts calls for the harmonisation of regulatory rules, at least
between  the two  giants,  through  international  law,  soft  law  or other
mechanisms. This is further discussed in Section C.
As a result,  regulators  from non-US  and non-EU  markets  may  have
to look to the two giants to determine how regulations develop and evolve.
For example, regulators in Hong Kong and Singapore, the largest financial
centres  in Asia  Pacific,  have  to look  to regulations  in not  only  the US,
but also the EU for clues, as traders in the two markets are either branches
of American,  European  or British  financial  institutions  or have  to trade
with major  market  dealers  in the West.31 Thus,  regulatory  developments
30 The US  and the EU  eventually  reached  an agreement  in 2016  regarding  the margin  rule
for non-cleared  derivatives.  See  Brunsden,  J.  and Stafford,  P.  (2016)  EU  and US  Strike
Derivatives Regulation Deal.  Financial Times, 11 February. Available from: https://www.ft.
com/content/b7f72eda-cfef-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77 [Accessed 6 September 2017].
31 For example, in both Hong Kong and Singapore, early consultation papers on derivatives
regulations all compare the developments in the US and EU and in Japan and Australia. See
Hong Kong Securities  and Futures  Commission.  (2011)  Consultation Paper  on the Proposed
Regulatory Regime for the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: SFC.
Available  from: http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/doc?refNo=
11CP6  [Accessed  6  September  2017];  Monetary  Authority  of Singapore.  (2012)  Proposed
Regulation of OTC Derivatives. P003–2012. Singapore: MAS. Available from: http://www.mas.
gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Consultation-Paper/2012/Consultation-Paper-on-Proposed-
Regulation-of-OTC-Derivatives.aspx [Accessed 6 September 2017].
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in the two major markets have immense effects on other markets, indirectly
affecting regulatory design, a point we elaborate as follows. 
Before  advancing  further,  we  must  consider  the meaning
of extraterritoriality. There has been some debate on the boundary between
extraterritoriality  and mere  territorial  extension.32 Professor  Joanne  Scott
defines extraterritoriality as
"the application of a measure triggered by something other than a territorial
connection with the regulating state".33
In contrast, territorial extension occurs when 
"the application  of a measure  is  triggered  by a territorial  connection
but in applying  the measure  the regulator  is  required,  as a matter  of law,
to take into account conduct or circumstances abroad".34
In the derivatives market, both effects have occurred. 
3.2.1 TERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF US AND EU REGULATIONS
Both US law and EU law try to define the territorial extension of derivatives
regulations by assuming jurisdiction over transactions conducted by home
institutions.  Essentially,  a foreigner  is  regulated  by American
and/or European  regulations   he  or she  conducts  a regulated  activity
in either  market.  For example,  in the UK,  dealing  in investments,  which
includes securities and other contract-based investments (e.g. derivatives),
as a principal  party  or an agent  is  a regulated  activity  that  requires
authorisation from the UK’s financial regulator.35
However, the scope of OTC derivatives regulations may be considerably
wider.  The clearing  mandate  demonstrates  the differences
in the jurisdictional scope of US and EU regulations. 
In the US, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (DFA)36 regulates activities that 
32 Scott,  J.  (2014)  Extraterritoriality  and Territorial  Extension  of EU  Law.  American  Journal
of Comparative Law, 62, pp. 89–90.
33 Ibid, p. 90.
34 Ibid.
35 See  Financial  Services  and Markets  Act  2000  (c.  8) ss.  19  and Schedule  2,  para.  2.  United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. London: HMSO. In English.
36 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111–203) s 723(h)(1),
12  USC  2(h)(1).  United  States  of America.  Washington:  Government  Publishing  Office.
In English.
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“… have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect
on, commerce of the United States (emphasis added)”.37 
In its  subsidiary  rule,  the Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission
focuses on the term "US person". One’s activities are governed by the DFA
if he or she is a US person, which is widely defined to include  any natural
person  who  is  a resident  of the US,  any  legal  entity  (e.g. companies
and partnerships)  organised  in or having  its  principal  place  of business
in the US, any trust governed by US law, any collective investment vehicle
organised under US law (except for those offered only to non-US persons)
and any  legal  entity  that  is  majority-owned  by the aforementioned
persons.38 
In contrast,  in Europe,  the European  Market  Infrastructure  Regulation
(EMIR)39 requires a trade to be cleared by a CCP subject to EU law if it  is
concluded between two European parties who are financial counterparties
or non-financial  counterparties  that  meet  the clearing  threshold.40 When
both  parties  are  from outside  the EU,  a trade  is  subject  to European
regulation  if the contract  has  a "direct,  substantial  and foreseeable  effect”
in the EU  or when  it  is  necessary  and appropriate.41 A further  delegated
regulation  clarifies  that  such  a direct,  substantial  and foreseeable  effect
means  that  a trade  is  guaranteed  by an institution  within  the EU
if the guarantee  is  above  a certain  amount.42 This  means  that  a totally
foreign transaction would trigger European regulation if there were some
financial effect in the EU. 
In short, the US extends its reach to certain foreign financial institutions
through  their  connections  with the US.  In contrast,  EU  law  emphasises
37 7 USC 2(i).
38 Interpretative  Guidance  and Policy  Statement  Regarding  Compliance  with Certain  Swap
Regulations,  78  FR  45292,  45316–45317.  United  States  of America.  Commodities  Futures
Trading Commission. Washington: CFTC. In English.
39 Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012
on OTC  Derivatives,  Central  Counterparties  and Trade  Repositories.  Office  Journal
of the European Union (OJ.  L.  201).  27  July.  Available  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R0648 [Accessed 6 September 2017]. (“EMIR”)
40 Ibid, Recital 13 and arts. 4(1)(a)(i) to (iii).
41 Ibid, art. 4(1)(a)(v).
42 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 285/2014 of 13 February 2012 supplementing
Regulation  (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council  with regard
to regulatory  technical  standards on direct,  substantial  and foreseeable  effect  of contracts
within  the Union  and to prevent  the evasion  of rules  and obligations.  Recital  5.  Office
Journal of the European Union (L85/1) 12 March. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:085:0001:0003:EN:PDF [Accessed 6 September 2017].
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financial effects on the market. Although there are some common features
in extending  regulations’  territorial  jurisdictions  to financial  institutions
in the home market,  the focuses  of the two markets differ  in certain ways.
US  regulations  focus  more  on a trader’s  identity.  In other  words,
the territorial extension of the DFA is built upon the person. Thus, if a trade
is purely between two foreign parties and has no effect on the US market, it
may still fall under US regulation if one party is considered a US person,
whose definition is wide enough to capture some foreigners. In contrast, EU
regulations  seem  to be  more  reserved,  as they  extend  the application
of the EMIR  only  to overseas  transactions  that  have  significant  financial
effects on the EU market if conducted purely between two non-EU persons. 
This poses a challenge for financial regulators in Asia. Asian regulators
are unlikely to have the luxury of imposing stringent regulations and wide
territorial extensions of OTC derivatives regulations. A wide jurisdictional
scope may push many transactions  offshore.  Systemic  risk  may increase
if there is insufficient liquidity to reduce the credit risk facing local CCPs.
As one essential tool to protect a CCP from a large insolvency or default is
to offset  contrary  trades committed  by the same trader,  the market  needs
to have  sufficient  liquidity  for people  to conduct  trading  and to have
a sufficient  number  of opposing  trades.  This  explains  why  Hong  Kong
and Singapore  require  trades  to have  some  degrees  of local  connection
to trigger the mandatory reporting obligation for OTC derivatives, through
either  physical  connections  (e.g. the residence  of the person  who  makes
the trade)  or effects  (e.g. a trade  booked  in the account  of a Hong  Kong
subsidiary).43 On the one  hand,  the rule  ensures  that  regulators  can  still
govern  trades  that  have  some  local  impact.  On the other,  by limiting
the jurisdiction  scope  of regulation,  it  would  not  have  the consequence
of driving  foreign  traders  away  as long  as the local  market  can  run
an equivalent regulatory system to that in the EU and/or US.
There is no doubt that the major financial centres in Asia want a share
of OTC  derivatives  trading  and clearing.  A certain  degree  of regulatory
competition  may  therefore  take  place.  As both  markets  thrive
as international  financial  centres,  there are a lot of foreign traders trading
43 Securities  and Futures  (Reporting  of Derivatives  Contracts)  Regulations  2013 (No. S  668),
regulation 2(1). Republic of Singapore. Singapore: MAS. In English. ("Singapore Reporting
Rules");  Securities  and Futures  (OTC Derivative  Transactions – Reporting  and Record  Keeping
Obligations)  Rules (Cap  571AL),  rule  4(1).  Hong  Kong  Special  Administrative  Region
of the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong: SFC. In English. ("HK Reporting Rules")
2017] C. Chen: Extraterritoriality of the Regulations ... 337
in either  market.  From this  light,  Singapore  and Hong  Kong’s  positions
should  be  sensible  to not  scare  away  foreign  traders  while  maintaining
control of the trades that have local connections and effects. 
3.2.2 EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF REGULATION
US  and EU  regulations  may  have  considerable  extraterritorial  effects
in other  parts  of the world.  The underlying  problem  is  that  at least  two
parties  are  required  to make  a trade.  Therefore,  even  if a party  has  no
connection to a country (e.g. the US), it  may be subject to the national law
of that country through the nature of the counterparty or through another
indirect  connection  to that  country.  Implementing  reporting  and clearing
mandates  for OTC  derivatives  may  exacerbate  the problem
of extraterritoriality  through  a wide  jurisdictional  scope,  as described
in the previous section.
Such extraterritoriality may affect non-US and non-EU market countries
or market  participants  (e.g. Singapore  or Hong  Kong).  First,  a transaction
conducted  completely  overseas  may  still  be  subject  to US  and/or EU
regulations. For example, a Japanese trader may be forced to submit a trade
to a US-based  trade  repository  for reporting  and/or a US-based  CCP
for clearing if the trader deals with a US bank. In this case, the transaction
falls  within  the jurisdictional  scope  of US  regulations  due  to the nature
of the counterparty. Although the Japanese trader is not a US person, they
may be forced to report  and clear  the trade in the US unless  the US bank
allows for reporting  and clearing  of the trade to or by a foreign  repository
or CCP,  raising  the issue  of foreign  system  recognition  and substituted
compliance (discussed below). This also means that the Japanese trader may
incur additional compliance costs if the same trade has to be reported twice
(once  to the US  and another  time  subject  to Japanese  law).  In short,
the extraterritorial  effects  of US  and EU  law  may  enhance  the legal  risks
and compliance  costs  of foreign  financial  institutions.  The effects  may
worsen if the US and EU continue to clash over CCP regulatory issues.44 
Second,  regarding  the trade  reporting  of OTC  derivatives,  such
extraterritoriality may affect information flow. Regulators outside of the US
44 Chon  G.  (2014)  Massad  See  End  to US–EU  Clearing  Disputes.  Financial  Times,  31  July.
Available  from:  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0a04f92-18c3-11e4-a51a-00144feabdc0.  Html#
axzz3PQyKFc50 [Accessed 6 September 2017];  Stafford P. (2014) Quick View: Clearing up
Differences. Financial Times, 16 June. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 3ccba18a-
f52d-11e3-91a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3PQyKFc50 [Accessed 6 September 2017].
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or EU  markets  may  not  have  complete  control  of information
and information  flow  if some  trades  conducted  in its  place  are  reported
to a US or European trade repository, whereas the US and EU have access
to a large  volume  of information.  How  such  an information  advantage
affects regulators and international competition outside of the core markets
remains to be seen.
Third, regarding the clearing mandate, if a party chooses to clear a trade
in a foreign  CCP,  the risk  associated  with the trade  may  also  shift
to the location of that CCP. This has two implications. First, it may increase
the total  risk  exposure  in the CCP  venue,  further  burdening  the CCP
regulator.  Second,  the regulator  of the trading  venue  may  have  to accept
that the risk associated with the trade is  governed by a foreign institution
and hence  the law  of the clearing  venue.  This  means  that  transactions
conducted in the trading venue may be regulated by the laws of the clearing
venue. 
For example,  an Australian  bank  conducts  a trade  with a US  bank
in Melbourne.  If the bank  decides  to clear  the trade  in a US-based  CCP
because  the US bank wants to ensure its  compliance  with US regulations,
the US  CCP  absorbs  the risk  associated  with the trade.  There  is  little
problem  if the CCP  stays  safe  and sound.  However,  if the CCP  runs
into financial  problems,  the primary  regulators  are  US  regulators.
For Australian  regulators,  the failure  of the US  CCP  may  mean  that
the Australian  bank  faces  counterparty  risk,  which  should  be  resolved
by the CCP.  However,  it  is  beyond the Australian  regulators’  jurisdiction
to handle a US CCP, which is thus left to the US regulators. In this sense, US
regulations have significant effects on a foreign market.
The same might also happen if there is more connection between futures
exchanges  (e.g. via  cross-trading  such  as the Eurex/KRX link).  The Eurex/
KRX link manages potential solvency risk of foreign CCPs by having trades
cleared  in the home  market.  For example,  a trade  conducted  by an Eurex
member during the trading hours of KRX would be cleared by the clearing
arm  of Eurex  in Europe.  In this  way,  the arrangement  is  more  like
an extension of trading hours hosted by another futures exchange. With no
local clearing in the host country, regulators in the host country (e.g. South
Korea)  would  have  less  issue  as risks  do  not  stay  and home  market
regulators  (e.g. Europe)  can  still  control  risk  from trading  committed
in the foreign  market.  Nonetheless,  this  would  become  an issue  if any
2017] C. Chen: Extraterritoriality of the Regulations ... 339
trading  link  between  two  futures  exchanges  involve  clearing  in the host
or a third market. 
There may also be global competition problems. For the clearing model
to work well, there must be sufficient liquidity. Therefore, a large exchange
operator  or clearing  service  provider  may  only  get  larger  with more
liquidity and probably a better pool of collateral to draw upon. Moreover,
a large  trade  repository  may  have  more  expertise  in collecting
and packaging  data  and have  a larger  volume  of data  available
for analysis.45 In fact,  some  large  data  repositories  have  significant
operations  even outside  of their  home markets.  For example,  Singapore’s
sole trade repository is a subsidiary of the DTCC,46 the US giant. Although
a trade  repository  is  still  locally  incorporated  and licensed,  data  may  be
aggregated across countries and US regulators may still have a say in how
to regulate the parent institution in the US. Thus, the extraterritorial effects
of US and/or EU regulations can hardly be avoided.
3.3 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
FOR NON-US AND NON-EU MARKETS
How can the territorial  extension  and extraterritorial  application  of major
market  regulations,  coming  from a highly  interconnected  market
with dominant dealers,  be addressed? From the angle of Asian regulators,
there may be several strategies for negotiating the extraterritoriality of US
or EU regulations. 
One solution  is  to require  firms  to comply with local  regulations  only
if they  or a transaction  fall  within  the jurisdiction  of local  regulators.
For example,  for mandatory  reporting  of OTC  derivatives,  Hong  Kong
requires  traders  to report  to the Hong  Kong  Trade  Repository.47 This
approach may ensure local regulators of data completeness.48 Nevertheless,
some US or European dealers may simply choose to trade in other markets
45 For example, it has been reported that the DTCC, a large trade repository, uses blockchain
technology to process over trade information worth over trillions of dollars a year. Murphy
H. (2017) Database Move Gives Blockchain its First Big Test Case. Financial Times, 9 January.
Available  from:  https://www.ft.com/content/aeb63b96-d64b-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e
[Accessed 6 September 2017].
46 The company is registered as DTCC Data Repository (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
47 HK Reporting Rules, footnote 43, rule 20.
48 Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. (2013) Consultation Conclusions and Further
Consultation on the Securities and Futures (OTC Derivative Transactions – Reporting and Record
Keeping Obligations) Rules, p. 59. Hong Kong: SFC. Available from: http://www.sfc.hk/edistri
butionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/doc?refNo=14CP8 [Accessed 6 September2017].
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to reduce compliance costs and legal risks. If so, this may not be good news
for a local regulator aiming to grow its market.
Another  solution  is  to allow  substituted  compliance  in an equivalent
jurisdiction  with a similar  regulatory  requirement.  In general,  substituted
compliance  means  allowing  a person  to comply  with local  law  by way
of complying  with the law  of a foreign  country.  In other  words,
the compliance with foreign law is a substitute for the compliance with local
law.  The allowance  of substituted  compliance  is  built  upon  equivalent
and mutual recognition, so that a local regulator may ensure that the quality
of compliance is upheld. This also means that a person cannot substitute his
or her local compliance obligation simply by complying with the law of any
country of choice. The country must be recognised by the local regulator.
For  example,  according  to Singapore’s  regulations  on trade  reporting
of OTC derivatives, a person is deemed to have complied with the reporting
obligation if any other party (or the principal party, if the specified person is
an agent) is incorporated under a foreign law and if that party is required
to comply with the reporting law of the foreign country.49 Thus, Singapore
allows for substituted  compliance  if the other  party  to a trade is  a foreign
person who is  obliged to report a trade pursuant to the laws in his or her
home country. 
Although allowing substituted compliance may help to address market
participants’ concerns over double compliance, it has its own shortcomings.
By  allowing  substituted  compliance,  a local  regulator  may  lose  a certain
degree of control, as it may not be easy to supervise the compliance process.
In addition, substituted compliance may mean that the local regulator does
not  have  control  of all  of the information  under  its  nose.  For example,
if reporting to a foreign trade repository were allowed, the local regulator
would no longer have direct access to information on some trades. Cross-
-border  regulatory  cooperation  may  resolve  this  problem.  For instance,
the Monetary  Authority  of Singapore  signed  a memorandum
of understanding  for information  sharing  with the Australia  Securities
and Investments Commission  in 2014.50 However,  unless  there is  a global
49 Securities and Futures Act s 128(1) and (2). Republic of Singapore. Singapore. In English.
50 See  the MAS.  (2014)  ASIC and MAS  sign  World-First  Memorandum  of Understanding
on Authorities’  Access  to OTC Derivatives  Trade  Repository  Data.  [online]  Singapore:  MAS.
Available from: http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2014/ASIC
-and-MAS-sign-World-First-Memorandum-of-Understanding.aspx  [Accessed  6  September
2017].
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agreement  on mutual  (or even  multilateral)  information  sharing,
the regulator  must  sign  multiple  agreements  with foreign  regulators
to achieve the effect. 
Substituted  compliance  may  even  have  a dire  implication  for non-US
and non-EU  regulators.  With the US  and UK  dominating  the OTC
derivatives market, it is perhaps reasonable to some major Western dealers
to choose not to trade in a market if the regulator  of that  market  does not
allow substituted compliance of the clearing mandate. However, allowing
substituted compliance of the clearing mandate also means that some local
trades may be cleared in a foreign CCP. This may affect the volume of OTC
derivatives cleared in that market. If the market’s regulator has the ambition
to grow  the clearing  business  of OTC  derivatives,  it  may  be  negatively
affected. 
In addition,  that  some local  trades involving local  market participants
may  be  cleared  in a foreign  CCP  implies  that  the local  regulator  must
depend  on the regulations  and enforcement  of the regulator  of the foreign
CCP  to ensure  its  solvency  and integrity.  As a result,  substituted
compliance of the clearing mandate is often allowed only if the alternative
clearing  venue  is  in a country  recognised  by the local  regulator  based
on equivalence and mutual recognition. For example, in Singapore, the law
generally  allows  for substituted  compliance  of the clearing  obligation
if the foreign  country  in question  is  a "relevant  clearing  jurisdiction".51
In Hong Kong, substituted compliance of the clearing mandate is allowed
if a trade  is  cleared  by a CCP  in that  jurisdiction  designated
by the regulator,  with the CCP  being  a designated  CCP.52 At the moment,
Hong  Kong’s  regulators  seem  to prefer  to recognise  member  states
of the OTC  Derivatives  Regulators  Group53 as "comparable  overseas
jurisdictions".54 Nevertheless,  substituted compliance  does not  negate that
the clearing  system  and related  risk  are  not  fully  under  the supervision
51 Securities and Futures Act s 129F(1). Republic of Singapore. Singapore. In English.
52 Securities  and Futures  (OTC Derivative Transactions – clearing and Record Keeping Obligations
and Designation of Central Counterparties) Rules (Cap 571AN), rule 11(1). Hong Kong Special
Administrative  Region  of the People’s  Republic  of China.  Hong  Kong:  SFC.  In English.
("HK Clearing Rules")
53 OTC  Derivatives  Regulators  Forum.  (2017)  Authorities  Currently  Involved  in the OTC
Derivatives  Regulators’  Forum.  Available  from:  http://www.otcdrf.org/about/members.htm
[Accessed 6 September 2017].
54 Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. (2016) Consultation Conclusions and Further
Consultation  on Introducing  Mandatory  Clearing  and Expanding  Mandatory  Reporting,
paras. [117]–[120]. Hong Kong: SFC. Available from: https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/
gateway/EN/consultation/conclusion?refNo=15CP4 [Accessed 6 September 2017].
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of the local  regulator.  How  substituted  compliance  affects  global
competition remains to be seen. Whether such mutual information sharing
would work also remains to be seen. Only time will reveal the real effects.
A final  solution  may  be  to harmonise  global  financial  regulations
to reduce differences and extraterritorial effects.  Regarding the derivatives
market, much like many other international financial regulatory standards
(e.g. the Basel  Accord),  there  is  no  international  hard  law  (i.e. treaties)
signed by states to implement a set of rules. Instead, the current method is
to implement  the regulations  through  the so-called  "soft  law  approach".
In the soft  law  approach,  regulators  around  the world  set  international
regulatory  standards  not  by negotiating  a formal  treaty,  but through
"informal  committees  of ministry  officials,  regulators,  or private  experts".55
The most  obvious  example  is  the Basel  Accord  for capital  adequacy
standards of banks, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
which  is  a kind  of transnational  regulatory  network  (TRN)  attended
by regulators  of major  world  markets.  Other  examples  of TRNs  include
the Financial  Stability  Board  (FSB),  the International  Organisation
of Securities Commissioners and the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors.  Together they are responsible for setting standards for many
regulatory issues  across  the three  main  pillars  of the financial  market.
For example, in addition to OTC derivatives regulation, the FSB is in charge
of designating globally and systemically important financial institutions.
Adopting  the soft  law  approach  reflects that  more  cross-border
regulatory  cooperation  is  necessary  to ensure  the solvency  and stability
of the globalised  and well-connected  financial  market.56 Although
negotiating  a treaty  may  be  time-consuming  and ill  fitted  for the fast-
-moving financial market, the soft law approach provides speed, flexibility
and expertise  through  the collaboration  of specialised  regulators.57
Nevertheless, whether this approach is sustainable and legitimate is a broad
question that is beyond the scope of this article.58
55 Gadinis,  S.  (2015)  Three Pathways  to Global  Standards:  Private,  Regulator,  and Ministry
Network. American Journal of International Law, 109, p. 1.
56 Brummer, C. (2012) Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
57 Verdier, P.-H. (2013) The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation.  Indiana
Law Journal, 88, pp. 1456–1459.
58 See generally Brummer, above note 55; Gadinis, above note 58; Shaffer, G. & Pollack, M.A.
(2010)  Hard  vs.  Soft  Law:  Alternatives,  Complements,  and Antagonists  in International
Governance. Minnesota Law Review, 94, pp. 706–799.
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Regarding OTC derivatives, the three mandates arose through the same
approach.  They  were  prescribed  by the G20  before  the FSB  issued
a guideline59 for each  member  country  to follow.  However,  not  every
country  has  implemented  the three  mandates  at the same  pace.
From the FSB’s periodical  progress report,  it  is  clear that several member
countries have not fully implemented the three mandates.60 After examining
the regulatory developments in Hong Kong, Singapore, China and Taiwan,
Gao  and Chen  find  significant  gaps  in the implementation  of the three
mandates  in East  Asia  outside  of Japan.61 For  example,  Hong  Kong
and Singapore  both  implemented  the reporting  mandate  first.  However,
Hong Kong issued its  final  clearing regulations for OTC derivatives only
in September 2016, and Singapore had not even published its final clearing
rules  by the end  of 2016.62 China  and Taiwan  are  not  even  close
to implementing any mandate. Even in major markets, there may be some
lag.  For example,  the EU  put  the trading  mandate  into  regulation  only
in 2014 through the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation.63
As Gao  and Chen  argue,  the time  gap  in implementing  the three
mandates reflects that other concerns and interests underlie  the economic
functions of the three mandates. For example, the reporting mandate is least
controversial,  as it  tries  to enhance  market  transparency.  Furthermore,
information  sharing  is  the biggest  hurdle  to overcome  even  if a country
allows substituted compliance, considering the wide US territorial extension
of the DFA.64 However,  for clearing  and trading  mandates,  other  national
interests (e.g. competition to become a larger international financial centre)
and domestic  concerns  (e.g. solvency  of local  financial  markets)  must  be
59 Financial Stability Board. (2010)  Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms. Basel: FSB.
Available  from:  http://www.fsb.org/2010/10/fsb-report-on-implementing-otc-derivatives-
market-reforms/ [Accessed 6 September 2017].
60 See Financial Stability Board. (2016) Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory
Reforms – Dashboard.  Basel:  FSB. Available from: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
Report-on-implementation-and-effects-of-reforms-dashboard.pdf 
[Accessed 6 September 2017].
61 See Gao and Chen, above note 15.
62 Ibid.
63 Regulation  (EU)  No. 600/2014  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 15  May
2014  on markets  in financial  instruments  and amending  Regulation  (EU)  No. 648/2014,
art. 28.  Official Journal of the European Union (L 173/84) 12 June. Available from: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0600 
[Accessed 6 September 2017].
64 See Gao and Chen, above note 15.
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considered.  This  complicates  the design  and implementation  of the two
mandates for Asian regulators.65 
Last,  would more harmonisation  facilitate  more  interconnection?  It  is
hard  to predict  the market  and how  regulations  may  evolve  in the fast-
-moving  financial  market.  This  article  believes  that  a higher  degree
of harmonisation of rules governing the derivatives market (no matter they
are about exchange trading, clearing or OTC market regulation) should help
more  interconnection  and competition.  With rules  in different  countries
more  akin  to each  other,  it  would  facilitate  traders  to conduct  trading
in different  markets  and reduce  legal  uncertainties  and potential
extraterritorial effect of national regulations. 
4. CONCLUSION
There is probably no other corner of the global financial market that is more
interconnected and polarised than the derivatives market. The high degree
of interconnection  also  poses  problems  for regulators,  especially
in countries  that  are  not  major  markets.  The US,  UK  and EU  dominate
the derivatives market. Although Asian markets may have niche products
or expertise in specialised products, they fall behind in the OTC markets.
The sheer dominance of Western markets and dealers twists the market
and the development of global regulations, granting US and EU regulations
significant  extraterritorial  effects  for activities  in non-US  and non-EU
countries.  On the private  law  side,  it  is  through  the total  dominance
of the ISDA master  agreement.  On the regulatory side,  Asian markets  are
almost  forced  to accept  the regulatory  reforms  on OTC  derivatives,
although  studies  have  shown  different  degrees  of implementation  due
to various  national  interests  and market  conditions.  Harmonising  global
regulations  at least  in major  markets  may  be  the solution  to reducing
the extraterritoriality  and territorial  extension  of the effects
of the regulations  of major  derivatives  markets,  such  as the US,  the UK
and Europe.  Although  some  international  organisations  may  lead
the efforts, there are still some technical differences and uncertainties ahead
for regulators in Asia and other developing countries.
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